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Most actors in the field of foreign aid agree with the call for coordinated engagement in 
fragile states in order to more effectively counter the consequences and origins of state 
failure. However, despite such demands, governments from OECD countries as well as 
multilateral agencies that are engaged in fragile states often continue to act in an 
uncoordinated manner and fail to reach higher levels of harmonisation. Why is effective 
coordination so hard to achieve? This article argues that three major challenges explain the 
persistent problems of donor harmonisation in fragile states: (1) the cognitive challenge of 
explaining the origins of state fragility and deducing effective instruments and 
interventions; (2) the political challenge of reconciling divergent political motives for 
engagement; as well as (3) the bureaucratic challenge related to the organisational logic of 
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1 Introduction 
Fragile states are difficult territory – not only for their citizens, who suffer immediately 
from poorly performing, defunct or hardly existing governments, but also for international 
actors, who see themselves confronted with the challenge to offer remedies for the ills of 
state fragility. This applies especially to international development agencies. Once passive 
bystanders to state decay and civil wars in their countries of operation, these organisations 
have increasingly become crucial actors with a set of instruments to offer beyond military 
coercion and diplomatic means; it includes engagement that comprises support for socio-
economic development to mitigate sources of conflict as well as civilian advice, 
bureaucratic assistance and technical support to help states provide necessary political 
order and manage conflicts peacefully. 
But why should donors interfere in fragile states in the first place? Unviable states have 
existed in the past, causing havoc at times, but evolving through disintegration or war into 
new, more viable entities. Today’s international system severely restricts this type of 
evolution by largely banning both interstate and intrastate war.1 States are no longer 
dissolved when they fail; they continue to exist as powerless hulls, with the rare exception 
of successful secession, such as in East Timor, South Sudan and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Stripped of the strongest force that allowed the restructuring of states, the 
international community discovered development policy as an alternative instrument for 
reforming weak states that are stuck in a development standoff.  
Over the past ten years, every major international development organisation has issued its 
strategy papers and flagship reports on how to deal with countries in fragility or conflict.2 
Studying these documents, one can hardly deny that donors have come a long way to 
understanding the logic and dynamics of fragility and conflict far better and in a more 
nuanced fashion than only a decade ago.3 Arguably the most important achievement of all 
has been the widespread realisation that state fragility is indeed a developmental issue. 
Mitigating the fragility of states and strengthening their capacity to deliver security and 
other basic public goods has come to be seen as the sine qua non of any development 
efforts.4 Likewise, there is general agreement that addressing the challenge of state 
fragility is more than just another facet that has been added to the overburdened agenda of 
the development business. Rather, it is considered to be perhaps the most challenging task 
of all, involving intervention in the highly complex issue of how societies organise 
themselves to resolve fundamental social, economic and political problems.5 
                                                 
1 Desch (1996) and Herbst (1990) show how the ban on interstate war prevents the restructuring of state 
borders. The “responsibility to protect” (Evans 2008) is a principle that in effect commits major powers 
not to tolerate civil war characterised by mass atrocities. 
2 Examples of relevant donor papers include OECD/DAC (2007); OECD (2011b); World Bank (2005, 
2011); BMZ (2005, 2007); DFID (2005, 2010); USAID (2005); M.A.E. (2007); SIDA (2005). 
3 A telling example is the World Bank’s (2011) World Development Report “Conflict, Security, and 
Development”. For a critical review, which nonetheless concedes that the report constitutes significant 
progress when compared to “the Bank’s standard development practices”, see Zaum (2012). 
4  As early as 2006, Necla Tschirgi observed that “[t]he necessity of linking security and development has 
become a policy mantra” (Tschirgi 2006, 41). 
5 On the importance official aid organisations attach to the topic of fragile states see, for example, United 
Nations (2004, 15; 2005a, 20–21; 2005b, 8) and OECD/DAC (2001, 37; 2008, 11). Among others, 
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In a marked improvement compared to earlier thinking (criticised, for instance, by 
Hameiri 2007), donors have begun to accept that state fragility cannot be effectively 
addressed if it is conceptualised as a purely technical issue, leaving aside the inherently 
political nature of state construction and its embeddedness in social and political conflicts. 
For example, in 2011, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding – a 
joint forum of development agencies and fragile state governments – proposed a “New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, giving priority to five “peacebuilding and 
statebuilding goals” of a highly political nature: legitimate politics, justice, security, 
economic foundations, and revenues and services.6 
In addition to agreement on some basic notions of state fragility and on its crucial 
relevance for development assistance, there is also an emerging consensus that external 
interventions must be organised in a highly coordinated manner if they are to be effective 
at improving the “state of the state” (OECD/DAC 2008, 23). Thus, what has been 
perceived as a general challenge for increased aid effectiveness – the low level of 
harmonisation and coordination among donor agencies – is of particular relevance for aid 
interventions in fragile states.7  
Yet, despite such efforts, a true agreement among the broader development community on 
priorities, strategies and instruments to address state fragility in concrete cases beyond 
general statements on joint objectives has not yet emerged. Equally, the level of 
coordination among donor agencies working in fragile states is far from sufficient, despite 
continuous promises of donor governments and multilateral agencies to better harmonise 
their interventions. While donor coordination is a persistent problem in most aid-receiving 
countries, a 2011 report on aid effectiveness from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) finds it particular challenging in fragile states. In 
these environments, the commitment for improved coordination among donors has been 
found to be low and the implementation of related measures weak (OECD 2011a, 26–27). 
The report identifies some progress in crafting joint funding mechanisms in fragile states 
but also highlights the persistence of coordination problems: the existence of many 
parallel implementation units, parallel joint funding mechanisms, and the separation of 
coordination mechanisms related to humanitarian aid and development assistance. 
Moreover, donors still fall short of engaging in joint context analysis in order to reach a 
common understanding of the origins of – and the remedies for – state fragility in concrete 
country settings (OECD 2011a, 56, 65–66).  
But why is effective coordination so hard to achieve, defying a decade of commitments to 
the contrary and a compelling case for joint approaches? Insufficient donor coordination in 
fragile states, this article argues, is not coincidental but caused by structural challenges. 
These challenges, we claim, come in three different types: a cognitive challenge that 
                                                                                                                                                   
North / Wallis / Weingast (2009) have recently made an influential scholarly contribution framing the 
entire development challenge as one of how basic issues of conflict and violence are organised within a 
society; see also North et al. (2007). 
6  See online: http://www.oecd.org/international%20dialogue/. 
7  Calls for more donor coordination and harmonisation are empirically backed by evidence showing how 
the fragmentation of donor agencies in aid-receiving countries negatively affects the quality of public 
administration and increases the level of corruption (Knack / Rahman 2007; Djankov / Montalvo / 
Reynal-Querol 2009). 
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emanates from unresolved uncertainties in the social sciences about the origins, triggers 
and drivers of development in general and the particular role of state fragility in this 
context; a political challenge rooted in the dilemma of whose well-being and security 
should reign supreme in the considerations of donor governments when “their security” 
and “our security” do not appear to call for the same set of actions; and a bureaucratic 
challenge originating in the natural interest of aid agencies – like any other organisations – 
to value their institutional survival higher than the achievement of goals they are expected 
to promote. All three challenges reflect deeper contradictions among external development 
actors and thus general problems of development policy, which are particularly salient in 
the case of state fragility. 
The article is structured as follows. Sections two to four address each of these three 
challenges in turn. They first discuss briefly their general relevance for development 
policy and then focus on the consequences of the relevant challenge in the context of state 
fragility. Section five concludes by summarising our main arguments and suggesting 
potential avenues out of the current deadlock. 
2 The cognitive challenge: What do we really know about state fragility? 
In this section, we argue that the current notion of state fragility in the development 
discourse is based on an eclectic concept that is unsuitable as a starting point for donor 
coordination. We defend this claim by recounting how the term “fragility” was established 
in the donor community as a rather unspecific problem description for a heterogeneous 
group of countries. By disaggregating the concept of state fragility into its components, we 
illustrate the ambiguities that result, thereby exacerbating coordination problems. We 
argue that the concept of fragility can be useful for policy-oriented research nonetheless, 
and we point out a remedy to its current drawbacks: using an explicitly multidimensional, 
non-additive model of state fragility. 
The limited consensus about the origins of economic and political development has 
traditionally been a crucial barrier to coordination and harmonisation in the field of 
development assistance.8 There is neither consensus across schools with different 
epistemological foundations (such as rational choice, critical or cultural perspectives) nor 
within the dominant rational choice framework. This is not a surprise or a drawback per 
se, since scientific progress is mostly made by contrasting opposing hypotheses, but a 
contested state of knowledge does not easily lend itself for coordinating policies. 
For example, the debate on the origins of economic growth differs over the extent to 
which growth-enabling institutions are determined by geographic factors and historical 
junctures (Acemoglu / Johnson / Robinson 2002; Keefer / Knack 1997; Easterly 2001; 
                                                 
8  For instance, recent studies on multi-donor budget support show how persistent coordination problems 
among donors are often linked to their different visions of the instruments’ goal hierarchy: some donors 
perceive financing poverty alleviation as the primary objective while others attempt to use budget 
support as leverage for advancing systemic institutional reforms in the field of governance (Faust / 
Leiderer / Schmitt 2012). Another example relates to democracy promotion, where European and United 
States (US) actors are said to behave differently because of their different underlying concepts of 
democratisation processes (Magen / Risse / McFaul 2009). 
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Hansen / Tarp 2001; Gundlach / Paldam 2009). Consequently, recommendations on how 
to stimulate the establishment of such institutions differ substantially. Another example is 
the debate on democracy and development. On the one hand, there has been a revival of 
Seymour Lipset’s (1959) hypothesis that economic development spurs the emergence of 
democratic institutions (Glaeser / Ponzetto / Shleifer 2007; Inglehart / Welzel 2009). On 
the other hand, empirical evidence also suggests an economic dividend for democratic 
countries (Lake / Baum 2001; Deacon 2009; Blaydes / Kayser 2011), indicating a 
reciprocal causal relationship.  
Controversial, reciprocal or multi-causal explanations may be prudent from an academic 
viewpoint, but they hamper coordination efforts. Weak academic guardrails leave policy-
makers with much latitude to choose their instruments and interventions, mainly according 
to their political and organisational preferences. True, the degree of latitude differs 
depending on the topic at hand. It is more pronounced in some areas of development 
policy than in others. The state fragility debate builds upon some of the most abstract and 
most complex socio-economic concepts. As a result, we argue, much of it has lost touch 
with its underlying theoretical foundations and has used inappropriate tools to analyse the 
matter of interest.9  
Regarding, for instance, the origins of state failure, the international donor community has 
given much attention to the work on fragile states by renowned Oxford economist Paul 
Collier and his colleagues (Collier 2007). Based on research conducted for the World 
Bank, their studies claimed to have identified some of the most important sources of state 
failure and gave well-defined advice on how development cooperation should intervene in 
these situations. Unfortunately, however, an equally prestigious panel of economists – 
when evaluating the World Bank research output – dismissed several of Collier’s 
conclusions on state fragility, arguing they were based on flawed concepts and a shallow 
transfer of correlations into causal mechanisms (Banerjee et al. 2006, 64). In this, as in 
many similar cases, a menu of diverse – or even contradictory – policy recommendations 
from academia provides policy-makers and practitioners with a large manoeuvring space 
to design aid according to their a priori preferences. Consequently, if a large variety of 
strategies can be justified as appropriate, coherent donor engagement becomes contingent 
upon other drivers of coordination. The problem itself – state fragility – no longer calls for 
it. 
A brief look at the history of the concept of state fragility helps in understanding some of 
the complications related to its use.10 As a term, “fragility” summarises various antecedent 
denominations for weak, decaying, failed, failing and other forms of defunct states. The 
concept of fragility, which was initially conceived of in academic debates whose roots lay 
in theories of state formation, was taken up by policy-makers when faced with government 
failures in Haiti and Somalia (Helman / Ratner 1992), but soon forgotten due to 
comparatively low economic and political relevance. The terrorist attacks of September 
2001 put weak states back on the agenda. Now they were assumed to be safe havens for 
                                                 
9  This is shown, for example, in analyses of state fragility indices (Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Ziaja 2012). 
10 We do not aspire in this article to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on causes and 
consequences of fragility. Rather, our goal is to discuss the policy consequences resulting from some of 
the main trends in this literature. Some works that investigate the causes and consequences of fragility 
include Carment / Prest / Samy (2010); Englehart (2009); and Patrick (2011). 
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terrorists, and thus a threat to the industrialised nations. While the new debate took 
previous literature on state formation (such as Tilly 1985; Migdal 1988; Desch 1996; 
Holsti 1996) into account, it referred more to its adjectives and labels than to the theories 
behind it (Khan 1995; Gros 1996; Milliken / Krause 2002; Rotberg 2003; Carment / Prest / 
Samy 2010). Given that many developing countries considered most of that terminology 
to be derogative, the aid community settled on “fragility” as a more neutral and less 
offensive term around the mid-2000s.11  
A variety of actors started developing indices to measure state fragility, including the 
Failed States Index by the Fund for Peace (2012) and the State Fragility Index by the 
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall / Cole 2011).12 These indices are usually 
accompanied by cautionary notes warning against the immediate transfer of index scores 
into policies. Nonetheless, their mere presence, ease of access and seeming objectivity 
make them highly attractive for use in policy circles (and beyond); influential policy 
documents, such as the World Development Report 2011 and the European Report on 
Development 2010, routinely refer to them.13 
The conceptual history of state “fragility” demonstrates that the term has increasingly been 
understood to capture a variety of distinct, if interrelated, problems of statehood at the 
same time. Much of the literature settles on varieties of three main dimensions: controlling 
violence; addressing popular demands for representation; and guaranteeing minimal living 
standards. Using a terminology suggested by Carment / Prest / Samy (2010), these three 
dimensions can be rephrased as the main functions of the modern state: authority, 
legitimacy and capacity. 
The authority function is, in its core, derived from a corporatist model of the state. A 
corporatist concept of fragility would be that of a state enterprise that has not yet muted 
civil resistance against its primacy. In line with Charles Tilly (1985), this strand sees the 
state as a “protection racket” gaining its profit and right to exist from the ambition to 
terminate civil war. As long as the cost of resistance remains lower than the cost of giving 
in, the population will continue to challenge this project. Following this view – even if the 
increased negotiating power of social groups in advanced nations forces the state to 
provide some extent of public goods – security remains by far the most important function 
of the state. 
The legitimacy function may be described with a constructivist model of the state. States 
may award the right to exist to each other, or their citizens do, depending on the level of 
analysis chosen by the researcher (Wendt 1994; Anderson 1991). This view implies that 
                                                 
11  In 2003 the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) established the “Fragile States Group” 
as a specialised platform to “deal with the specific issues and needs of fragile states” (OECD 2006, 13). 
The term gained its ultimate international acceptance around 2010, when the “g7+”, a group of self-
declared fragile states, established itself as an interest group vis-à-vis OECD donor countries and 
negotiated the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” adopted at the Busan High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness in November 2012. 
12 For an overview of these indices, see Fabra Mata / Ziaja (2009). 
13 See also Paris (2001) for an account on how research and policy-making on fragile states affect each 
other. 
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the future of a state depends upon the acceptance by its own population, by other states 
and even by other states’ populations.  
The capacity function fits into a contractualist concept of the state. Here, one could define 
a fragile state as a subsystem of society whose boundaries and competences have not been 
properly defined – it is in conflict with society. There are several explications for the 
persistence of such a condition that draw on equilibria in their political economy, such as 
Joel Migdal’s (1988) “triangle of accommodation” or Kalevi Holsti’s (1996) “state-
strength dilemma”. The provision of public welfare figures as the most prominent 
function. States that neglect this task alienate their people. 
One might therefore argue that fragility is a dispensable aggregate of already rather 
abstract concepts, appropriated by policy-makers and of little analytical utility. We would 
cautiously disagree for mainly two reasons. First, fragile statehood fills a gap on the 
continuous scale between the extremes of a (well-)functioning state and the state’s full 
absence. Second, the concept of fragility points out the importance of considering state 
functions in their interactions. Whereas the different schools of thought have put more 
emphasis on one or the other basic function of the state, the concept of fragility offers a 
framework to re-examine the state with a thicker but nonetheless integrated and 
generalisable theory (see Coppedge 2012, 52–62). 
It is true that many states underperform in all three categories, thus deserving to be 
labelled as “fragile” – but they do so in very different constellations. Colombia and 
Mozambique, for example, close neighbours on the 2012 Failed States Index (84.4 and 
82.4 points each), lag behind in different state functions. The Colombian state is capable 
of providing public services, but challenged in its authority by rebel groups. In 
Mozambique, by contrast, the state struggles with providing basic services to its 
population, but there is currently no armed resistance against its authority. Maintaining 
this information beyond the aggregation stage is crucial to preserve the analytical utility of 
the fragility concept. Without a distinction at a disaggregated level, a diagnosis of 
“fragility” offers little by way of explanation, let alone promising ideas about how to 
overcome the “disease”. In fact, policy guidelines have become more and more complex, 
encompassing an increasing number of considerations to capture such diverse realities as 
those in post-conflict Nepal and in post-war Iraq as well as in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and 
in post-revolutionary Libya. Unsurprisingly, in their efforts to provide guidance, donor 
platforms such as the International Network on Conflict and Fragility of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) resort to advice at the highest possible level 
of aggregation: principles and procedural recommendations (see OECD 2011b and OECD 
2007). Thus, taking “context as the starting point” (OECD 2007, 1) has arguably become 
the policy truism sticking in policy-makers’ minds more than any detail. While this is 
undeniably progress over any ideas of imposing blueprint solutions on a given fragile 
country, it is at the same time too generic to provide a promising platform from which a 
joint donor response could readily emerge. This is because, more often than not, 
disharmony will already have begun with the question of how to assess the quality of the 
given context. 
Even a seemingly more concrete recommendation such as to “focus on state-building as 
the central objective” (OECD 2007, 2) does not bring harmonised strategies much closer, 
since state-building is meant as a generic concept for all activities that run directly counter 
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to the ills of fragility: support legitimacy and strengthen the capabilities of states, 
including the provision of security. 
What is lacking is a more nuanced picture of state fragility between a single “score” for a 
fragile country on the one hand, and the anarchic picture that emerges when every country 
context is considered as qualitatively different. That such approaches are possible has 
recently been shown, both through formal modelling (Besley / Persson 2011) and through 
data-driven clustering (Grävingholt / Ziaja / Kreibaum 2012). A larger research 
programme along those lines – on the basis of which policy recommendations could be 
developed, tested and refined – has yet to emerge.  
3 The political challenge: Security for whom? 
Development assistance has traditionally been confronted with a political challenge: 
Which interests should it serve? Is aiding poor countries really about external development 
promotion, or is development assistance mainly an instrument of donor countries’ security 
and foreign economic policy? Obviously, politicians responsible for organising 
development assistance often neglect this tension and claim to prioritise the goal of 
development promotion. Nevertheless, there is abundant empirical evidence showing how 
the allocation of aid followed interests other than external development promotion, and 
some governments have typically been more outspoken in admitting to national interests 
taking precedence in foreign aid over others.14 Anecdotal as well as econometric evidence 
has demonstrated that selecting partner countries and allocating aid is often connected to 
particular interests of donor governments.15 During the Cold War, aid was often primarily 
used as an instrument to gain support of poor countries’ governments in the East-West 
confrontation. Even today, a disproportionate part of French and – to a lesser degree – 
British development assistance is allocated among their former colonies in order to 
maintain special influence in those countries. Almost all of Taiwan’s development 
assistance goes to governments that recognise the country as a sovereign state. Japanese 
aid in East and South East Asia has often been tied to buying Japanese products, and 
German technical cooperation is often tied to the use of German expertise. Humanitarian 
aid of the United States has gone disproportionately to countries that aligned with the 
United States on votes in the UN (Drury / Olson / Van Belle 2005). Thus, probably every 
donor government allocates aid not only according to altruistic motives, but has special 
diplomatic, security or economic interests at stake (e.g. Alesina / Dollar 2000; Claessens / 
Chong / Gradstein 2008; Cassimon / Campenhout 2009). Consequently, a donor’s 
motivation for coordinating his activities with others will be constrained by those very 
diplomatic, security or economic interests, resulting in inadequate coordination and 
harmonisation. 
                                                 
14 Traditionally, for instance, the United States has pursued foreign aid as a subordinate instrument to 
security interests, whereas in Germany, leftist and conservative coalition governments differed markedly 
in the extent to which they referred especially to economic interests as a legitimate concern in 
development cooperation. 
15 For narrative evidence, see for instance Browne (2006); for econometric evidence, see Thacker (1999); 
Alesina / Dollar (2000); Dreher / Jensen (2007). 
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Harmonising strategies for fragile states also poses a political challenge. Whose interests 
are served when combating fragility? The general aid-allocation literature distinguishes 
several dimensions of donor interest that may be served by development aid. They include 
political (e.g. gaining support in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly), economic 
(e.g. opening markets), cultural (e.g. promoting colonial languages) and security concerns 
(e.g. containing terrorism). The latter is by far the most prominent when dealing with 
fragile states. Obviously, donor activities designed to address state fragility have an 
immediate bearing on a government’s broader security concerns. Whereas at the 
conceptual level donor organisations and governments show a diversity of opinions on 
whether fragile statehood is best understood as an expression of failed development, a 
generic term for poor governance, or a state of imminent (or recently experienced) violent 
conflict, significant agreement exists that in the ultimate consequence, fragile states pose 
far-reaching security risks. Two prominent examples illustrate this line of reasoning. In 
2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change installed by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan – although avoiding the terminology of fragile states, but 
dealing with exactly those issues that, since then, have become part and parcel of the 
fragile-states agenda – argued that “[a]ny event or process that leads to large-scale death 
or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international 
system is a threat to international security” (UN 2004, 12; emphasis added). 
Three years later, the OECD-DAC’s “Policy Commitment to Improve Development 
Effectiveness in Fragile States”, adopted at a High-Level Meeting of development 
ministers and heads of agency, while defining fragile states largely along the lines of 
underdevelopment coupled with bad governance, still maintained that “[t]he spill over 
effects resulting from state fragility – violent conflict, organized crime, migration, drug 
trafficking – resonate with concerns about international stability and global development” 
(OECD / DAC 2007, 4; emphasis added). 
Clearly, for donor governments or development agencies, the urgency of the topic stems 
from its international or global implications – implications that are made even more 
explicit in individual donor countries’ fragile-state strategies. Box 1 gives several 
examples derived from relevant donor strategy papers.  
It is precisely the immediate security dimension that accounts for the highly politicised 
character of the debate on – and the practical responses to – the fragile states issue. 
Diverging political interests and a multitude of actors are common features of most policy 
areas and certainly not a distinctive feature of aid in general, nor the fragile states debate 
in particular. But state fragility causes major security concerns not only within societies 
suffering from fragile statehood but also in the outside world that fears being affected by 
all kinds of negative spill-over effects. Such effects result from governance failure, violent 
conflict and the existence of territories under no internationally accountable authority. The 
economic costs of civil war for neighbouring states, for example, have been well 
documented.16 Likewise, terrorist incidents that have been traced back to “safe havens” for 
terrorist organisations in territories under no government control have spurred an intense 
debate on the global effects of civil war and other forms of state failure (Mallaby  
 
                                                 
16 For an overview, see Collier et al. (2003, 33–41). 
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2002). More recently, the resurgence of piracy is linked to fragile statehood in Somalia 
and elsewhere. Besides terrorism and piracy, increased production of narcotics and the 
accelerated spread of HIV/AIDS have also been counted among the most costly global 
side effects of major violent conflict (Collier et al. 2003, 41–49). 
While diverging political interests and a multitude of actors are common features of many 
policy areas, the degree of contestation is particularly high when it comes to security 
matters – for obvious reasons: first, because among all preferences harboured in societies, 
security is a top priority concern commanding high levels of attention; and second, 
because different notions exist of what constitutes security and whose security deserves 
primary attention when state fragility is addressed. Thus, contestation begins with the very 
concept of security. It is useful, therefore, to recall recent developments in the 
international discourse on the concept of security. 
Traditionally, security in the international arena has been conceived of as national (state) 
security, framing states as the relevant actors of international relations and defining the 
absence of physical or other external threats to the integrity and independence of a nation 
(state) as the ultimate goal of all efforts to achieve or maintain security. This state-centred 
concept of security is often considered an outcome of the “Peace of Westphalia” of 1648 
Box 1:  Global security ramifications of state fragility – excerpts from donor strategies for fragile 
 states 
“When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap 
around the world.” (USAID 2002, Foreign Aid in the National Interest; quoted in USAID 2005, v) 
“Events of the last few years have tragically brought home the reality that situations unfolding on the 
other side of the world—governments collapsing, criminal and terrorist networks, humanitarian crises, 
and grinding poverty—can have global ramifications. Weak states tend to be the vector for these 
destabilizing forces, manifesting the dark side of globalization, and pose a very difficult kind of national 
security challenge.” (USAID 2005, v) 
“Our stakes in these countries are high. No conflict-affected country is on track to achieve a single 
Millennium Development Goal by the 2015 target. ... Conflict spreads across borders, and state failure 
can breed chaos and allow transnational crime and terrorism to flourish.” (USAID 2013) 
“Fragile states can destabilise regional and global security.” (DFID 2005, 10) 
“Conflict and fragility are significant challenges to international peace and security and to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).” (DFID 2010, 10) 
“[…] fragile statehood and poor government performance can have a destabilising effect on 
neighbouring regions and give rise to threats on a global scale, including the spread of human rights 
abuses and conflicts, flight and migration, destruction of natural resources, weakening of regional 
economies and a growth in the power of the perpetrators of violence and their integration into 
transnational criminal economies (shadow globalisation).” (BMZ 2007, 10) 
“For hundreds of years, strong and well-functioning states posed the greatest threats to global peace. 
Today, however, it is above all weak state structures which present a major challenge to global security. 
The destabilizing potential of weak states transcends state boundaries. Weak states serve as transhipment 
points for illicit trade in weapons, drugs and cultural property, and for human trafficking; they offer safe 
havens for terrorist networks, and they endanger unhindered legitimate commerce. In most cases, 
inaction bears major risks, including risks to our own security.” (AA / BMVg / BMZ 2012, 1) 
“Disengagement is not an option. […] Nor can any country simply isolate itself from fragile states when 
there are such clear but complex links to their own national security. […] fragile states clearly affect 
national and regional security issues more broadly.” (Anderson 2005, 1, 3 [for AusAid]) 
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and was a cornerstone of the “European balance of power” until the Napoleonic wars, and 
again of the “Concert of Europe” after 1815, and it has even prevailed throughout the Cold 
War period.  
In Europe, an extended notion of national security – termed “comprehensive security” – 
gained popularity in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The concept of 
comprehensive security was developed within the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). It referred to the OSCE’s approach of addressing not only 
politico-military issues but also issues of economic cooperation, humanitarian aspects, the 
environment and others as relevant dimensions of security.17 Today, it is part of the 
OSCE’s identity to point out that references to human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
guiding principles in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, upon which the OSCE was built some 
20 years later, “represented the first acknowledgement in an international document of the 
direct link between human rights and security” (OSCE 2007, 3). Thus, comprehensive 
security introduced a perspective on the individual human being into the security debate, 
although ultimately the nation-state remained the main actor and addressee in the OSCE 
security concept. 
When development agencies began to increasingly turn their attention to security matters 
during the latter half of the 1990s, they often did so on the basis of a concept of human 
security. Human security was introduced in international discourse by the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report with the 
declared intention to shift the focus of attention from territories to people and from arms to 
development (UNDP 1994). Since then, human security has developed into a popular, if 
contested, concept of considerable persuasive power, at least in the political arena. While 
discussions about the analytical value and the exact scope of human security (broad vs. 
narrow conceptualisation) have accompanied the history of the concept from the very 
beginning – and are not likely to disappear any time soon – and some authors would rather 
dismiss it altogether, its core notion of defining security from the perspective of the 
individual has become widely accepted as a guiding line for international aid agencies.18  
In particular, human security has also informed donor governments’ thinking about and 
conceptualising of the fragile states issue.19 The World Development Report (WDR) 2011 
picked up on the very same idea, focussing on individual security as being the one central 
dimension that was found wanting in fragile states (World Bank 2011). Although the 
WDR avoided the contested term of human security, it introduced the hitherto uncommon 
term of “citizen security” into the debate and in fact defined it closely along the lines of a 
narrow understanding of “human security”. 
                                                 
17 The OSCE’s notion of comprehensive security was laid down in the 1996 “Lisbon Declaration on a 
Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century”. It refers back 
to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act with its three “baskets” of issues pertaining to security in Europe: 
politico-military aspects of security; “co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology 
and of the environment”; and “co-operation in humanitarian and other fields”. 
18 A small selection of critical and affirmative writings on human security includes Paris (2001); Owen 
(2004); Human Security Centre (2005); Kaldor / Martin / Selchow (2007). 
19 Most references to human security in strategy papers on fragile states, however, are rather implicit. For 
an explicit reference, see BMZ (2007, 9). Bøås / Jennings (2005) propose to base the very concept of 
state fragility on the concept of human security. 
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Yet, while human security has succeeded in bringing home forcefully the message that any 
talk about development is meaningless in the absence of basic human security, and that at 
the same time human security will always be at risk if fundamental elements of 
development are missing, the concept cannot solve one principal dilemma: When it comes 
to donor–recipient relations in development policy, human security and national security 
refer to different constituencies – citizens of recipient countries on the one hand, and 
citizens of donor states on the other. Catering to both at the same time with the same 
instruments is not impossible if circumstances are benign and the interests among several 
parties involved happen to coincide. But just as often, national security concerns can lead 
to conclusions that differ squarely from a pure development perspective on how concrete 
incidents of fragile statehood should be addressed. Providers of security in typical donor 
countries, for instance – such as the military, intelligence agencies, or the police – are 
organisations that historically have little in common with development agencies.20 
Thresholds of entry into – and exit from – engagement in fragile states usually differ, and 
so do indicators of success and the preparedness to condone unintended consequences of 
engagement, in particular with regard to human suffering among the local population.  
Under such circumstances, it is not only programming at the individual recipient country 
level that is faced with serious challenges. Even formulating coherent general strategies to 
address fragile states is a difficult task if national self-interest and human security interests 
of populations in faraway countries are to be reconciled. 
Additional problems arise when it comes to harmonising fragile-state strategies among 
several donor countries. Where national security interests are concerned, donor govern-
ments will be highly reluctant to give up – at least outside established security alliances – 
what they consider to be important discretionary room for manoeuvre if it is just for the 
sake of coordinated development strategies. In fact, even national strategy papers on 
fragile states often reflect the diverging preferences of the security and development 
establishments. Major critical issues, such as joint decision-making on resource allocation, 
significant investments in long-term preventive activities etc. are either left aside or 
papered over when documents reproduce common wisdom and general statements that are 
easy to agree upon.  
From a pure development perspective, donor governments’ primary interest in their own 
countries’ security may be deplorable. On the other hand, it is a logical consequence of 
governments being tied to national constituencies that introduce their own preferences in 
the policy-making process (e.g. Moravcsik 1997). Those preferences, however, can 
change over time and begin to include long-term calculations as to the usefulness of 
human security for people living in faraway countries, and there are indications that such a 
process has been underway in such high-profile cases as Afghanistan.  
Moreover, the aid-allocation literature has given rise to the interesting observation that 
donor countries that are themselves characterised by “better governance” tend to display a 
higher “commitment to development” in their actual policies than donors with not-so-good 
domestic governance (Faust 2008, 2011; Schudel 2010). There is some likelihood that the 
same logic may apply with regard to the development–security nexus. Higher 
                                                 
20 On the issue of the developmental-military interface, see Klingebiel / Roehder (2004). 
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responsiveness of the donor government to popular demand may actually be a useful 
feature for a better integration of national (“homeland”) security with the human security 
interests of foreign peoples. 
4 The bureaucratic challenge: Does strength lie in numbers? 
Beyond the cognitive and political challenges described above, the task of implementing 
coherent development-oriented policies in fragile states is beset with a third dilemma: the 
bureaucratic challenge that comes with the organisational fragmentation of the system of 
international aid agencies. The continuous growth of donor agencies during the last 
decades has caused serious problems of organisational proliferation (e.g. Acharya / Fuzzo 
de Lima / Moore 2006): Numerous multilateral, bilateral and non-state aid agencies are 
not only driven by their developmental objectives and the interests of their political 
principals; but as with every organisation, official donor agencies as well as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are also interested in organisational survival and 
expansion.21 Accordingly, aid agencies also behave as agents of their own objectives, 
pursue special interests and often have little incentive to cooperate in order to harmonise 
their interventions. Instead, when competing for financial resources, each of them will 
attempt to demonstrate its unique contribution to effectively combating poverty and 
misery (Knack / Rahman 2007). 
Not surprisingly, the contamination of the international aid industry by the aid agencies’ 
own bureaucratic interests has been a particular concern noted in several critiques of 
development assistance (e.g. Easterly 2002; Easterly 2008; Acharya / Fuzzo de Lima / 
Moore 2006; Gibson et al. 2005). In fact, the negative impact of bureaucratic interests on 
more coordinated and harmonised aid interventions in a highly diverse system of 
competing international aid agencies is considered a crucial obstacle to be overcome for 
improving aid effectiveness. Calls for disciplining aid agencies via increased harmo-
nisation and alignment to recipient governments’ own strategic priorities have been 
particularly prominent in the Paris Agenda for Aid Effectiveness (High-Level Forum 
2005). However, recent evaluations on the progress of harmonisation and alignment have 
been sobering (OECD 2011a) and case studies provide evidence on how bureaucratic 
resistance within aid agencies hampers better-harmonised and coordinated aid inter-
ventions (e.g. McCormick / Schmitz 2011; Winters 2012).  
The obstacle of bureaucratic resistance is of even greater concern in the context of fragile 
states. Usually characterised by low levels of administrative capacity, weak coherence of 
government agencies and little domestic legitimacy, fragile states are almost by definition 
unable to align a multitude of donors along their own priorities. The idea of harmonising 
donors around local agendas, policy priorities and country-specific administrative 
                                                 
21 From a principal-agent perspective (e.g. Martens et al. 2002; Gibson et al. 2005, 61–87; Faust 2011), aid 
agencies’ special interests are particularly problematic because they often have a massive information 
advantage over their principals – be they taxpayers or their representatives (parliaments) in donor 
countries or the intended beneficiaries in the developing world. Such a principal-agent perspective can 
also be extended to agencies that deal with both developmental and security issues, such as the 
European External Action Service (Furness 2013). 
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procedures simply neglects the fact that, in fragile states, often no-one is truly empowered 
and able to negotiate and coordinate binding actions. Furthermore, state fragility causes 
additional reluctance by aid agencies to become aligned where the lack of effective and 
transparent administrative structures increases the fiduciary risks of external financial 
engagements. As a consequence, donors tend to resort to “second-best harmonisation”: a 
weak alignment role of the recipient government; huge political and organisational 
investments by the donor community; and parallel structures of decision-making and 
implementation. 
In sum, aid workers, soldiers, police personnel and non-governmental organization (NGO) 
representatives from numerous donor countries all scrimmage in fragile states, ending up 
in games that involve many principals and far more agents. Turf fighting remains an 
essential activity on the ground, thus seriously hampering the effectiveness of external 
engagement (see UNDP 2006, 51). It is difficult to explain from a developmental 
perspective why there have been nine parallel pooled funds in the new state of South 
Sudan (OECD 2011a) or why, in post-disaster settings, the provision of financial 
resources is often accompanied by a massive inflow of uncoordinated NGOs, imposing 
huge transaction costs on the recipient administration. The competition for qualified local 
personnel among a multitude of aid agencies causes huge transaction costs on recipient 
states’ administrations. Another consequence of development cooperation in fragile states 
is the agencies’ necessity to buy out local competence, even if only for supportive tasks, in 
order to bring a planned project to a passable end. In the capital cities, aid programmes use 
ministries as human resource pools, thus causing a brain drain of scarce human capital 
away from the state apparatus. Accordingly, donor fragmentation negatively impacts on 
administrative quality and control of corruption – thus further diminishing one of the 
scarcest resources in fragile states (Knack / Rahman 2007; Djankov / Montalvo / Reynal-
Querol 2009). 
5 Conclusion 
Given the three challenges of aid discussed, it is obvious that donor governments and 
development agencies have still a long way to go if the declared objectives of policy 
coherence and harmonised approaches are to be reached when dealing with fragile states.22 
Conceptual ambiguities make it difficult to define the scope and characteristics of fragile 
statehood. Despite considerable progress on empirical data, research still lacks a 
convincing paradigm to account for state fragility and derive conclusions for prevention 
and treatment. At the same time, development agencies have to tackle the challenge that 
“development” is not the only name of the game and that, as a consequence, other actors 
bring in both competing interests (political challenge) and diverging routines (organi-
sational challenge). 
As fragile states are likely to remain a concern of development practitioners for many 
years to come, progress on the general agenda of improving aid effectiveness will not least 
depend on better aid delivery to countries suffering from state fragility. In light of the 
                                                 
22 Donors have registered their general commitment to coherence, co-ordination and harmonisation in the 
2005 Paris Declaration (see High-Level Forum 2005). 
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rather pessimistic outlook given in the above analysis, three considerations may offer 
possible directions out of the impasse. First, more investment in knowledge is still likely 
to yield new insights and help overcome some of the starkest problems of conceptual 
ambiguity in the fragile states debate. Large-scale empirical research on the effects of 
external engagement in fragile states is still in its infancy. Given the dimension of the 
issue at stake and the volume of money devoted to military interventions in only a few 
singular cases, funds earmarked for sustained research and the dissemination of results are 
still more than modest. 
Second, the high level of politicisation that comes along with the (national) security 
implications of the fragile states problem for donor governments must not necessarily be 
only a curse but may also be a blessing. If political pressure to address a particularly 
difficult problem increases, new opportunities may arise to break old deadlocks. It is a 
typical phenomenon of political decision-making that compromise between hardly 
reconcilable positions becomes possible if a real danger exists that the costs of having no 
solution at all will be immediately felt and exceed those of a painful compromise. Many of 
the important steps forward towards an agreed-upon international agenda for addressing 
state fragility have become possible in the immediate aftermath of severe crises, such as 
the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the deadlock over the Kosovo case in 1999, and 9/11. Making 
this agenda work better for development in the interest of those who suffer most, is the 
task ahead. 
Third, complete harmonisation may in fact not even be desirable. While the immediate 
negative consequences of conceptual and strategic ambiguity among donors should be 
minimised to avoid unintentional but significant damage to those immediately affected  
by fragile statehood, a certain level of diversity – or even competition – concerning 
approaches and strategies is not the wrong thing to have. Thus, only through scientifically 
guided comparison can we arrive at reliable conclusions about which modes of 
intervention are more promising than others. Without diversity, such comparison cannot 
be drawn. Coordination, therefore, should not be understood as a means to prevent 
diversity but as a process to organise a deliberate division of labour, whereby “good 
practice” can first emerge before donors go about advocating it for harmonisation. 
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